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Specific research findings are introduced to demonstrate the
absence of reliable data supporting claims for the effectiveness
of delinquency treatment programs currently in use. Progress in
this field will be encouraged if those responsible for treatment
programs apply various techniques with a great deal of skepticism,
testing their effectiveness systematically and evaluating them ob-
jectively. Continued innovation is urged, but cast in the form of
careful field experimentation.
ADMINISTRATORS of delinquency pre-vention and treatment agencies
seem now, more than ever, to be
searching for alternative programs that
will work. Hence it is timely for a
student of delinquency to sow the
seeds of skepticism among them. Many
of the alternatives currently being
touted in the literature and at con-
ferences are being claimed &dquo;proven
effective,&dquo; already demonstrably suc-
cessful. I would have these claims
greeted with grave doubt. This article
is meant to arm those responsible for
developing programs against well-
meaning but possibly ultimately empty
promises.
We need desperately to identify al-
ternatives for delinquency prevention
and treatment that will work. We
cannot afford to leap from fad to fad,
hoping that the next one will solve
the problem of delinquency better
than the last, which appeared promis-
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ing at first but somehow seemed finally
to make no difference at all. The costs
are immense and the need is critical.
Ambiguous Figures
Let us consider this critical need
and, in doing so, provide an illustra-
tion of the usefulness of skepticism.
The urgency of the problem of ju-
venile delinquency emerges full force
from the statistics: young people are
accounting for larger and larger pro-
portions of cleared crimes, even fel-
onies, and more juveniles are running
afoul of the law.’ I do not quarrel
with these data; but I am skeptical
about their interpretation. Do they
mean that America’s youth are grow-
ing more delinquent? The fact is that
the official statistics on juvenile de-
linquency compiled by police, courts,
and institutions are so far from the
reality of the actual delinquent be-
havior of juveniles that they cannot
tell us whether our children are be-
coming more-or less-delinquent. The
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uni-
form Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Offiee, 1970).
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violative behavior of youth has only
slight relationship to the official data.
The official statistics on juvenile de-
linquency reflect as much, if not more,
the behavior of uniformed policemen,
juvenile police officers, court workers,
and judges as they do the behavior of
the juveniles themselves. It is clear
from studies of delinquent behavior,
confessed in confidentiality to neutral
interviewers by representative samples
of American youth, that the perpetra-
tors of only 3 per cent of the total
chargeable offenses committed by
American youth are known to any law
enforcement officer.2 Almost half of
the male offenders apprehended in one
Michigan city were actually less de-
linquent than most of the boys who
were never caught at all.s And only a
small proportion of the most delin-
quent juveniles ever appear in any
record.4
Is delinquency increasing? No one
knows. Public outcry about the law-
lessness of our youth is a problemati-
cal reaction to what may very well
turn out to be a mythical beast. On
the other hand, it may be just as well
that the public believes delinquency
is growing to monstrous proportions,
it that is the only basis for public sup-
port of remedial programs. For de-
linquency is a problem, in quality, if
not in quantity.
We ought to be concerned about
frequent and serious juvenile law-
breaking, wherever we find it and
whether it is increasing or not. For
delinquency is a symptom of trouble,
in an individual and in a community.
As to its portent for individuals, Lee
N. Robins, in her outstanding twenty-
year follow-up research of children’s
agency referrals,5 has demonstrated
that referral for delinquent behavior
is more predictive of adult maladjust-
ment than referral for any other
reason. Adults who had been diag-
nosed as neurotic, psychotic, border-
line schizophrenic, etc., as juveniles
were no less well integrated into their
communities than a comparable group
of adults who had never been seen by
a children’s agency. However, the de-
linquent children grown up were beset
by a plague of troubles-unemploy-
ment, criminality, mental illness and
hospitalization, and early death by
natural and unnatural causes.
It is not clear from Robins’ data
whether it was the delinquency which
signaled future difficulty or the re-
ferral which started all the trouble.
We cannot ignore the latter possibility
-namely, that being identified as a
delinquent, referred to a juvenile court
or some other children’s agency, and
treated as a delinquent in one way or
another, with whatever good intent,
itself creates the condition for future
maladjustment. The data on this issue
are more than disconcerting: they in-
dicate that juveniles who are caught
at delinquent behavior by law enforce-
ment officers are more likely to commit
further delinquent acts than compar-
able offenders who are not caught. It
is not yet clear what it is about being
apprehended that encourages rather
than discourages delinquency, but at
least two independent studies are re-
markably in agreement on this point:
whatever forces are set in motion by
the apprehension of a juvenile of-
fender, their net effect is to provoke
2. Jay R. Williams and Martin Gold, "From
Delinquent Behavior to Official Delinquency,"
Social Problems, Fall 1972, pp. 209-29.
3. Martin Gold, Delinquent Behavior in an
American City (Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole,
1970) .
4. Williams and Gold, supra note 2.
5. Lee N. Robins, Deviant Children Grown
Up (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1966) .
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more delinquent behavior in the fu-
ture than they deter.6 And if it is true,
as Robins’ research suggests, that ju-
venile delinquency is a harbinger of
adult maladjustment, we do neither
an individual nor his community any
good in the long run by catching him
and treating him in the ways we do
these things nowadays.
Those who are responsible for de-
linquency prevention and treatment
programs may be convinced that their
programs are doing their young clients
some good and that they certainly
cannot be doing them any harm. But,
again, it is wise to be skeptical, for
how do we know that?
The best data at hand demonstrate
that we have not yet solved the prob-
lem of the effective treatment of de-
linquency. To place this in a historical
context, it has not been long since
medical science was not advanced
enough to cure. It was only at the turn
of the century that consulting a phy-
sician offered a sick person a better
chance of recovery than any old home
remedy or nothing at all. What little
technology medical science had de-
veloped seventy years ago was canceled
by the infectious dangers surrounding
doctors and hospitals. That, I submit,
is where the treatment of delinquency
and most other social ills stands today.
We are still in the pre-scientific stage.
I believe that medical science turned
the bright corner when the laboratory
and the field setting merged, when the
lessons and the methods of scientific
research were translated from the lab-
oratory to the hospitals and to the
communities. It seems to me that so-
cial treatment will not advance until
a comparable merger occurs.
One Fad:
Why Skepticism Is Needed
An illustration of the current use-
and abuse-of science in delinquency
research and treatment is Guided
Group Interaction. It is cited here-
but not because it has received little
scientific attention. Quite the con-
trary. No other specific treatment
strategy has been more carefully re-
searched ; no other strategy is grounded
in more explicit and coherent theory
of delinquent etiology.
Guided Group Interaction consists
typically of a group of adolescents-
from six to a dozen, all of them with
delinquent records-meeting from two
to five times a week for an hour or so
to discuss their behavior. Often one
member of the group is put in the
&dquo;hot seat&dquo; and his behavior particu-
larly is subjected to extensive critique
by his peers. At other times, problems
are discussed more generally. Essential
to the process of Guided Group Inter-
action is that the peer group is given
a great deal of real power in the treat-
ment process: to set its own agenda;
to put one or another member in the
&dquo;hot seat&dquo;; and to determine when a
member is ready, by virtue of his
exemplary behavior, to be released
from the program, subject only to rare
veto by the adult leadership.
Guided Group Interaction has be-
come something of a movement. Since
the report of its earliest use with
juveniles in New Jersey by McCorkle,
Elias, and Bixby,7 it has been intro-
duced widely from coast to coast.
Traveling troupes of experts have
sprung up to train in its use. A litera-
ture has developed around it. And
even the sites of its employment have
6. Gold, op. cit. supra note 3; Martin Gold
and Jay R. Williams, "The Effect of Getting
Caught," Prospectus: Journal of Law Reform,
December 1969, pp. 1-12.
7. Lloyd W. McCorkle, Albert Elias, and
F. Lovell Bixby, The Highfields Story (New
York: Henry Holt, 1958).
23
tended to adopt a common suffix to
their names-so the original Highfields
gave rise to Essexfields, Collegefields,
and so on.
Several applications of Guided
Group Interaction have been subjected
to the scrutiny of careful research-
the original Highfields study, the pro-
gram at Provo, the Marshall Plan, and
Silverlake8 among them. The social
scientists and practitioners who dedi-
cated themselves to the development
of this treatment strategy are to be
commended for their concern and
their courage. But it is somewhat curi-
ous that the results of the research
program have had so little impact on
the practice of Guided Group Inter-
action. For the conclusions of the re-
search are consistent in finding no
effect. Whether compared to typical
institutionalization in some studies or
to probationary services in others, the
superior effectiveness of Guided Group
Interaction has not yet been demon-
strated. Yet we witness agencies all
over this country and abroad turning
confidently and enthusiastically to this
strategy as though it had been proved
successful.
What I have just said of Guided
Group Interaction might just as well
have been said about other treatment
programs-individual or group psycho-
therapy, behavior modification, street-
work with gangs, diversion away from
The System, recreational programs,
Big Brother or Big Sister programs-
except that most of these have not
been nearly as thoroughly evaluated.
My point is to demonstrate how pre-
scientific our practice now is.
Why Skepticism Will Help
The lesson to be drawn here is not
to stop everything until research ident-
ifies the effective programs; if we come
to a standstill we are unlikely to de-
velop or identify successful programs.
Individuals responsible for the devel-
opment of programs are key figures to
progress in the field; they are in con-
trol of the only laboratories in which
programs can really be tested. In order
for them to play the part required
for progress, they must continue to
innovate programs of delinquency
prevention and treatment. But what is
also required of them, paradoxically,
is that they do this with less dedication
than they now show-and greater
skepticism. Or, to describe their role
more positively, they need to become
somewhat less dedicated to the treat-
ment program they happen to be con-
ducting at any one point in time, and
more dedicated to discovering whether
it is doing anyone any good.
This presents a formidable chal-
lenge. It is hard to get on with the
difficult job of treating delinquency
without a wholehearted belief in the
efficacy of the effort. As one who has
himself been responsible for the care
and treatment of seriously delinquent
and disturbed boys and girls, I know
that it often takes a deep-seated con-
fidence in one’s ultimate success to get
over those desperate days which befall
anyone in this business. Nevertheless,
we must learn to eschew the luxury
of utopian visions. We must sustain
ourselves with the stuff of dedicated
and hard-headed experimenters. We
8. H. Ashley Weeks, Youthful Offenders at
Highfields (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of
Michigan Press, 1958); LaMar T. Empey, Al-
ternatives to Delinquency Treatment (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 1968) ; Doug Knight,
The Marshall Program II. Amenability to
Confrontive Peer Group Therapy (Sacra-
mento, Calif.: California Youth Authority,
1971); LaMar T. Empey and Steven G. Lu-
beck, The Silverlake Experiment (Chicago:
Aldine, 1971).
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must be eager to know what does not
work if we are ever to learn what does.
And I also understand that some
administrators must wrestle with a
whole other set of considerations
which requires at least their public
dedication to whatever they are doing.
Some are involved more or less di-
rectly in the politics of delinquency
prevention and treatment. They are
directly or indirectly accountable to
impatient and often irascible publics
to whom they must sell every program
undertaken. And nothing succeeds like
claims of success. Perhaps the hardest
thing to sell the public is an honest
experiment, with its open admission
that we really do not know how it will
turn out. Still, the public can be edu-
cated to the need for experimentation.
After all, people have come not only
to expect but to demand that medical
treatments be proved. We need to
have the courage of our skeptical con-
victions in the social area and to in-
still it in our various publics.
At minimum, I urge those who are
considering alternative programs to
question whether they have been sub-
jected to careful scientific study and,
if so, to inquire of the methods and
the results. For example, were com-
parable control groups also studied or
did the program assure its own success
by selecting clients who in all likeli-
hood would have done well if simply
left alone? Who were counted as suc-
cesses and failures? Did the dropouts
from the program count against it?
What kinds of data were used to de-
termine whether delinquency went up
or down?
But to ascertain simply that a pro-
gram works is a minimum require-
ment. That knowledge is hardly
enough to make the program adopt-
able elsewhere. It is important to ask
why it worked. What is it about that
program that prevented further de-
linquent behavior? Why should doing
whatever was done affect delinquency?
What new processes, social or psycho-
logical, are supposed to be set in mo-
tion by the program that may be
relevant to delinquency? And were
these processes indeed set in motion?
In short, what is the theory behind
the program? And only when the
theory is clear, and the way the pro-
gram implements that theory is made
explicit, can that program be adapted
knowledgeably to some other setting.
Such provocative questions will en-
courage, I hope, a confrontation with
the realities of today’s practice. What
is needed is an unflinching look into
the state of things as they are. Love is
not enough; dedication is not enough;
good intentions are not enough; even
plausible but untried theory is not
enough. I submit that we must now
invoke sharp intelligence, a new kind
of courage-courage to bolster a lack
of conviction-and an ample dose of
skepticism.
